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When asked, by the editors of this special issue of the Essex Human Rights Review, to reflect on 
my own work for the prevention of torture, I soon found myself as much reflecting on the word 
‘prevention’ as on the work itself. Why, after all, would a visit to a place of detention by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on torture (of which I did a good number) not be considered preventive, 
when similar visits, using similar methods, by the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (CPT) or the UN Subcommittee on 
Prevention of Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (SPT) 
were so understood? I shall return to this after discussing a little of the history. While 
international preventive machinery will be the main focus of this reflection, advocating 
prevention at the national level has been, perhaps, the major part of the work, so let me start 
there. 
 
It is a commonplace for those involved in working against torture to find that the phenomenon 
could, indeed, be prevented by eliminating what we, at Amnesty International (AI), called ‘the 
preconditions of torture’. From the earliest days of the AI’s first international campaign against 
torture (which began in 1973, the year I became the organisation’s first legal officer), we were 
aware that torture happened to people when they were held at the sole mercy of their captors and 
interrogators (incommunicado detention). The longer they were denied access to and from the 
outside world (i.e. to family, lawyers, doctors, courts) the more they were vulnerable to abuse by 
those wishing to obtain information or confessions from them.  
 
This wisdom was reflected in the outcome of AI’s 1973 Paris Conference on the Abolition of 
Torture.1 It was a short step from there to the UN General Assembly in 1975, which, on the heels 
of the adoption of the Declaration against Torture,2 set in motion the drafting of principles 
against arbitrary arrest and detention that would precisely limit the pre-conditions of torture. It is 
no accident that the eventual product took thirteen years to emerge. The Body of Principles on 
the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment3 touched on areas 
of great sensitivity for states. It was one thing for states to make an international commitment not 
to engage in a practice – torture – that was illegal anyway under their own national laws; it was 
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another to deny their often under-trained and under-resourced law enforcement and security 
agencies the opportunities they felt they needed to do the job expected of them, whether of 
repressing opposition or of (at least appearing to be) responding to popular demands for 
‘effective’ public safety measures. 
 
It may be that AI’s renewed Campaign against Torture (1984-85) played a role in moving things 
forward. A centrepiece of that campaign was AI’s 12-Point Programme against Torture.4 Many 
of the 12 points called for safeguards against torture that were reflected in the draft Body of 
Principles, especially those aimed at restricting any incommunicado detention to the briefest of 
periods. I was involved in drafting this programme; as head of what by then had become AI’s 
Legal Office, I was involved in trying to get the best possible Body of Principles out of the UN. 
This entailed mobilising the organisation’s national sections to seek to persuade their 
governments to support stringent safeguards and engaging in direct meetings with government 
representatives. 
 
I continued this work in 1993 (having left AI in 1990), when I became Special Rapporteur on 
Torture. I found myself reconfiguring the language of the Programme, though the message was 
the same: torture is a crime and, like many other crimes, is a crime of opportunity. If only by 
virtue of their powers of detention, law enforcement officers have more opportunity than most to 
criminally abuse those in their charge: these opportunities needed to be restricted or removed. In 
the end, I argued, the traditional paradigm of opacity in places of detention needed replacing by a 
paradigm of transparency. These notions were reflected in the compilation of the already 
exacting recommendations that I inherited from my predecessor as Special Rapporteur, Pieter 
Kooijmans, the first mandate-holder (1985-1992). Technological advances made it possible to 
begin advocating the use of audio-visual recording of interrogations, a practice that had been 
introduced into the UK by the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act5 and was generally 
acknowledged to have contributed to a substantial reduction in reports of police abuse. Most of 
the recommendations in the 12-Point Programme were aimed at preventing prolonged 
incommunicado detention. The UN Commission on Human Rights endorsed the elimination of 
this practice.6   
 
So far, I have focused on exploring the development of international and inter-governmental 
support for international standards to be followed at the national level. Much of the country-
specific work involved trying to persuade governments that they should adopt, or implement 
effectively, these standards. Typically, I would find myself arguing that they owed it to their law 
enforcement officials to give them the means to dispel false accusations of torture or similar 
abuse. 
 
My involvement in the evolution of ‘preventive’ international machinery goes back to the 
meeting of experts convened by the late, retired Swiss banker Jean-Jacques Gautier. Inspired by 
the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in visiting prisoners of war 
and, later, political detainees, he promoted the idea of an obligatory system of regular visits to 
places of detention by an international body. (The ICRC had the right to visit prisoners of war, 
but was only allowed to visit political prisoners if the government in question agreed and did not 
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change its mind.) At the meeting, convened by the Swiss Committee against Torture (SCAT), 
founded by Gautier, to which I was invited by virtue of my function at AI, we agreed on a draft 
UN convention that would reflect the idea of an international system of visits to places of 
detention. Like the ICRC, the body to be set up by this convention would be required to keep the 
reports of its visits confidential. However, we agreed that it should be able to make these reports 
public if the country in question failed to deal with the problems discovered. While it would not 
be in a position to follow the ICRC practice of conducting random or follow-up visits to ensure 
those interviewed were not subjected to reprisals, we made provision for ad hoc visits, if the 
international body deemed this to be necessary (for example, on the basis of information from 
NGOs). 
 
In the event, the time was not right for including this type of system in the ‘implementation’ 
provisions of the UN Convention, on which drafting began the following year. It was felt that it 
would be necessary to follow the pattern of other treaty bodies’ functions (review of periodic 
reports by states and, possibly, on an optional basis, consideration of individual and interstate 
complaints) with perhaps ‘a bit more’. In the end, the ‘bit more’ was the 1984 UN Convention 
against Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (UNCAT) 
Article 20 provision permitting the Committee Against Torture, created under the UNCAT, to 
initiate an inquiry into an apparent systematic practice of torture.7 As part of the inquiry, the 
Convention could request, but not require, the State Party in question to permit an on-the-spot 
visit. The SCAT text was formally introduced by Costa Rica as a draft protocol to the proposed 
UNCAT, but it was not taken forward until after UNCAT had been adopted. 
 
SCAT, in cooperation with the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), decided to try the idea 
out at the regional level. In the Council of Europe (then a grouping of Western European States, 
divided from the east of the continent by the Cold War), the project prospered. The text was 
worked on by the Council’s Consultative Committee on Human Rights, on which the ICJ and AI 
had observer status. Less transparent than the UN, it met in closed session. I recall our having to 
mobilise two of AI’s national sections to address the fact that their governments were trying to 
carve out a right to exclude access in emergency conditions, as that could have rendered the 
system nugatory. In the end, a satisfactory compromise was achieved whereby a government 
could make representations, urging that the visiting team avoid a particular institution 
temporarily, but the team would be able to have access to relevant individuals elsewhere; 
moreover, the decision on whether the institution in question would be visited was not left to the 
sole discretion of the State. I do not believe this sensible outcome would have been possible 
without the actions of the relevant national AI sections, whose governments, while publicly 
maintaining their strong support for the project, were insisting on the exception. Since the 
sections did not act at the public level, AI maintained the confidentiality of the process. 
 
After the CPT got under way8 and went on to achieve the success it is generally acknowledged to 
have attained, my main contact was of an informal nature. For example, to the extent consistent 
with respect for confidentiality, in my capacity as Special Rapporteur, I was able to elicit from 
the CPT some orientation in respect of countries that I was concerned about, notably in the 
context of my own visits. Later, as an academic, I was invited to discuss issues relating to 
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arguments being raised post-11 September 2001 that sought to justify torture, despite its absolute 
legal prohibition. 
 
Eventually, in the late 1980s, the SCAT, which became the Association for the Prevention of 
Torture, sought to revive the Costa Rica draft protocol to UNCAT. I confess that, when they 
approached AI, I was lukewarm to the idea, not because I doubted the intrinsic merits of the idea, 
but because I was sceptical that, even if the UN adopted it in unadulterated form, the UN would 
be able to assure the necessary independence of membership or provide the appropriate 
resources. The whole UN human rights budget was a fraction of that of the ICRC. Worse, there 
was a real risk that any system that would emerge could end up giving governments an excuse to 
exclude the ICRC by virtue of their participation in the new UN system. Already, I was aware of 
two European governments that, confronted by sustained terrorist operations, were resisting 
suggestions for ICRC access to their prisoners on the grounds that their acceptance of the 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment (ECPT) system made ICRC access unnecessary. 
 
After I left the organisation, AI decided to support the re-launch of the Costa Rica protocol and 
that gave it the necessary political momentum. During most of the drafting period, I was Special 
Rapporteur. My predecessor had already expressed support for the protocol and it would have 
been inappropriate for me to contradict him. In any event, as a matter of principle, the protocol 
remained a good idea. 
 
Accordingly, in my communications with the Commission on Human Rights working group, 
which was drafting what became the 2002 Optional Protocol to UNCAT (OPCAT), I adopted a 
position of support for the idea, while insisting that there should be no back-tracking on the 
ECPT system, especially in relation to the right of unannounced and ad hoc visits, and also 
stressing the need to devise means of ensuring that the eventual sub-committee (SPT) would 
have the independence, and access to expertise and resources, that it would need to do the job 
properly. 
 
There ended my involvement. The removal from the text of provision for ad hoc visits, and the 
exiguous resource problems that the SPT now faces,9 indicates the limits of my influence! On the 
other hand, I cordially acknowledge the inspired innovation in the final text of a key obligation 
on States Parties to create national preventive mechanisms (NPMs) that will be able to have 
cooperation from the SPT. This makes for a substantially different project, the prospects for 
which conduce to at least cautious optimism. 
 
I turn now to the question of the meaning of ‘prevention’ in the context of these issues. 
Evidently, establishing the kind of safeguards against incommunicado detention discussed earlier 
is preventive in a pure sense. Removing the opportunity to torture, of necessity prevents it. Why 
this should be the case for a particular technique of visiting prisoners and places of detention is 
less clear.  
 
Part of the answer may be sought in the (also elusive) meaning of other words we commonly and 
loosely use to describe activities aimed at advancing human rights. We often use, essentially in 
contradistinction to each other, the words ‘promotion’ and ‘protection’. Promotion covers a 
range of generalised, basically non-intrusive activities, such as advocacy for and development of 
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(new) international standards, and provision of human rights education as part of formal 
education and training, particularly for those involved in law enforcement or the administration 
of justice more generally. ‘Protection’ on the other hand, tends to connote activity aimed at 
attacking specific human rights violations. It is used especially to describe activities that would 
be considered application of the law: investigation, reporting, making formal assessment of 
responsibility in individual cases, and so on.10 In sum, the focus is assignment of responsibility 
and establishment of accountability, if not of individuals, certainly of the state. Accordingly, the 
activities of courts and treaty bodies, or UN Special Rapporteurs, when examining cases or 
country situations − often described as ‘monitoring ‘or ‘supervision’ or, most strongly, as 
‘implementation’ − are seen as falling under the idea of ‘protection’.11   
 
Why, then, is work such as that of the ICRC, which inspired the ECPT and the OPCAT, 
considered prevention, rather than promotion or protection? The question is accentuated by the 
fact that most aspects of promotion and protection can be seen as broadly preventive. For, just as 
national criminal law is justified to a significant extent by its supposed deterrent effect (i.e. 
prevention of future criminality), so exposure and denunciation may be hoped, if not expected, to 
have a similar result on preventing, by deterring torture. Yet we do distinguish between crime 
prevention (using locks on doors) and protection (finding and prosecuting burglars).   
 
The answer seems to lie in a few specific aspects of the work of the ICRC and the entities 
inspired by it. Briefly, and at the risk of caricaturing, the basic approach consists of being in a 
country and making unannounced visits to places of detention, conducting unsupervised 
interviews with prisoners, and making confidential reports to governments. The approach also 
involves making unannounced return visits to the same places. How does that differ from a visit 
by the Special Rapporteur – or, for that matter, by the Committee against Torture carrying out an 
UNCAT Article 20 inquiry? The Special Rapporteur (like the Committee against Torture) has to 
be allowed into the country for a specific visit, but can and does make unannounced visits to 
places of detention and can also hold unsupervised interviews with prisoners. His (or her, 
though, to date, all the Special Rapporteurs on torture have been male) report is public. He 
cannot make unannounced return visits after leaving the country and can only usually rely on the 
support, where available, of civil society to seek to establish contacts with interviewees (e.g. 
through prisoner welfare organisations or local ombudsman-type officials). Follow-up support 
can not, however, be counted on. 
 
Thus, what is perceived as being essentially preventive about the ICRC’s work is its ability to do 
sustained visiting over time and its non-impugning of the public level of the government in 
respect of any torture or other abuses identified. The government, according to (unverifiable, but, 
by the same token, unrefutable) expectations, will move to address the problem once apprised of 
it. Of course, this does not always happen, but there is a strong belief that external access by the 
ICRC tends to ensure the safety of those it has met.  
 
As for the Special Rapporteur, and risking some oversimplification, it is clear that there is 
nothing sustained about his visits. The key element is the public report, with its factual 
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conclusions (not on individual cases, but on the situation) and specific recommendations. Thus, 
this role encompasses the investigation and exposure dimension of protection, as understood 
above. Yet, in many ways the Special Rapporteur’s visits cannot be as directly protective of the 
individuals who have been met as are those of the ICRC, if only because of the effective 
impossibility of undertaking follow-up visits.  
 
The work of the CPT falls somewhere between the paradigms. Its visits are like those of the 
ICRC, except that there is no in-country presence and the occasional ad hoc visit cannot 
effectively make up for this. Its reports are confidential (albeit most are eventually published 
with the agreement of the governments concerned). It is perhaps this dimension that, at bottom, 
is invoked to support any preventive aspect of the work. As ICJ Secretary General Niall 
MacDermot put it: 
 
The sponsors of this proposal consider its great advantage is that it does not involve any 
public attack or accusation being made against the government concerned. Consequently, 
the government is not thrown upon the defensive and has no incentive to impose delays, 
but rather has an incentive to cooperate under a confidential procedure in remedying any 
abuses which may exist.12 
 
Gautier himself summarised the essential aspects of this issue, arguing that ‘instead of a state 
being found guilty of a violation, stress will be laid on prevention.’13 
 
So here we have it: prevention means we save the state’s face, in return for which we hope to get 
more effective action than would be achieved by exposure. The subtext is that confidentiality is 
the price of sustained or regular access. 
 
If prevention differs from the work of the UN mechanisms operating at the public level, it does 
so in the manner in which it delivers, or aims to deliver, protection. Tellingly, the title of the text 
first submitted to the Council of Europe, which eventually became the ECPT, was ‘Draft 
European convention on the protection of detainees from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment’ (emphasis added). Similarly, the explicit purpose of the original Costa Rica draft 
optional protocol to the draft UNCAT, according to its one preambular paragraph, was to 
achieve the ‘implementation’ of the future UNCAT. 
 
As to the OPCAT, there are still too many unanswered questions to know how to characterise the 
work to be done under it. The visiting practices of the SPT, even if properly resourced, do not 
explicitly include ad hoc visits, so may hardly be any different from Special Rapporteur or 
Committee against Torture visits, but without the public reporting. Here, prevention can be little 
more than a euphemism for non-exposure. The powers and functions of NPMs remain even more 
ill-defined at this stage. On average, NMPs may be little different, apart from working in a 
specific field, than other National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs): that is, ombudspersons, 
national human rights commissions, personeros, médiateurs, and so on. Indeed, in some 
countries, it will be the NHRI that will also be the NPM. Their work is auxiliary to that of the 
usual organs of justice. The reader may decide whether any of the words we have been 
discussing as applicable at the international level, provide a useful description of the national 
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If, after decades of using the word myself, I now seem to be questioning the use of the word 
‘prevention’, it is not to seek to change it. It has served the function of making palatable to states 
what might otherwise have been less palatable. There should be no doubt, however, that, in the 
case of torture prevention is not better than cure. Prevention is protection by another name. It is 
remedial, rather than prophylactic.  
